Uber: Competing Globally

Uber London Limited found to be not fit and proper to hold a private hire operator licence.  

—Headline, Transport for London press release, November 25, 20191 

In November 2019, Transport for London (TfL), the transportation authority of the British capital,  denied Uber a new license to operate in Greater London. TfL claimed that Uber exhibited a “pattern of  failures” regarding existing regulations and concluded that the ridesharing company “is not fit and  proper at this time.”2 Following the decision, CEO Dara Khosrowshahi lamented, “This TfL decision  is just wrong. Over the last two years we have fundamentally changed how we operate in London.”3 

TfL’s decision was met with approval by London’s taxi drivers, who objected to what they viewed as  Uber’s preferential treatment by regulators and its increasing encroachment on their market share.  “We’ve won the battle, let’s see who wins the war,” said one of London’s traditional black cab drivers.4 

It was not the first time Uber had clashed with local authorities in London and elsewhere. Since July  5, 2010, when Uber’s first rider used the app to hail a ride across San Francisco, California, the company  had engaged in a confrontational relationship with regulators and incumbents in markets worldwide.  Uber cast itself as a technology platform as opposed to a transportation company, and it had a history  of circumventing regulatory processes required of competing transportation operators. With venture  capital backing, Uber further raised the ire of competitors by heavily subsidizing drivers and riders to  get them to switch to Uber whenever it entered new markets.  

On September 28, 2020, after nearly a year of appeals, a judge reversed TfL’s denial, granting Uber  permission to operate in London for the next 18 months.5 It was the latest development in a long,  fraught history between Uber and TfL. The Silicon Valley-based company could ill afford to lose such  a prominent and populous market, especially with increased pressure to achieve profitability as a  public company. Worldwide, both Uber and its CEO were under tremendous scrutiny, and  Khosrowshahi knew that navigating the pushback from local and national governments and  established competitors was essential to Uber’s success. What would Uber’s strategy be over the next  18 months to ensure its long-term survival and success in London? Over the long term, what strategy  would ensure Uber’s global success as the transportation landscape continued to evolve? 

Professor Alexander J. MacKay and Case Researchers Amram Migdal and John Masko (Case Research & Writing Group) prepared this case. This  case was developed from published sources. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the  company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary  data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. 

Copyright © 2020, 2021, 2022 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800- 545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized,  photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School. 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Uber Company Background 

In 2009, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp founded Uber. Late the previous year, they had come  up with the idea of calling and paying for a cab via a smartphone app after struggling to find a taxi on  a wintry night in Paris.6 By 2011, the company had expanded beyond the Bay Area to New York City,  Chicago, and other U.S. markets. In December 2011, Uber launched in Paris, marking its first  international foray. The company expanded rapidly, entering Australia in 2012 and Africa, Asia, and  South America in 2013 (see Exhibit 1). In 2018, Uber derived 56% of its $10.9 billion in revenue from  operations in the United States and Canada, 18% from Latin America, 16% from Europe, the Middle  East, and Africa, and 9% from Asia Pacific (see Exhibit 2). By 2019, Uber was in 700 cities worldwide,  where three million drivers used the platform to provide more than 15 million rides each day.7  

Evolution of Uber Products 

At its founding, the company then known as UberCab offered private luxury car service in the San  Francisco area, which riders could call with a push of a button on their phones. Customers were  primarily Silicon Valley executives, and UberCab was marketed as a more convenient and reliable  black car service with professional livery drivers. Riders requested rides using the app, and available  drivers would then receive a notification and could accept the ride. A built-in mapping function then  guided the driver to the rider’s pickup location and destination. Riders paid via the app, which pre stored their credit card information. At the time, rides typically cost about one-and-a-half times as  much as a taxi fare, and Uber kept 20% of each fare, while the rest went to the drivers.8 

In 2012, UberX debuted, allowing non-professional drivers to offer rides in their own vehicles via  the Uber platform. UberX fares were about 35% lower than Uber’s black cars (now called UberBLACK)  and competitive with, and often lower than, taxi fares.9 By 2019, Uber had added a cheaper carpool  option (UberPOOL), an electric bike- and scooter-sharing option (JUMP), a meal delivery service (Uber  Eats), and a number of other options (see Exhibit 3). Not all offerings were available in all locations.  One Uber employee said, “When we enter a new city, we launch with a standard package. We let riders  get used to our core products, and then we iterate and alter our offerings depending on the market’s  reaction.”10 In 2018, the ridesharing company facilitated 5.22 billion rides worldwide on its platform  and was approaching 12 billion rides offered cumulatively since 2015 (see Exhibit 4). 

Uber for Riders 

To use Uber, riders downloaded the app on their smartphones, registered for an account, and  entered their credit card information. Through a simple interface, riders submitted their desired  destinations and were shown projected arrival times and pricing across available service options (e.g.,  UberX, UberPOOL, etc.). Once a rider made a selection, Uber alerted nearby drivers and matched a  driver. The rider could see the driver’s name and customer rating, the make, model, and license plate  number of the vehicle, and the estimated arrival time at the pickup and drop-off locations. The app’s  map allowed riders to track drivers’ progress in real time while awaiting pickup and during rides. As  rides concluded, the app charged riders’ credit cards—fares varied by product, distance, and  availability—and riders could leave a tip and rate drivers; drivers also had the ability to rate riders.  

Uber for Drivers 

Eligible drivers could sign up to use Uber’s platform by registering for an account, submitting a few  documents, meeting local vehicle requirements, and passing an online screening.11 In 2019, Uber  charged drivers a flat fee for each trip and kept 25% of the gross fare, which was based on set per-mile  

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and per-minute rates determined by an algorithm.12 When there were more ride requests than there  were drivers available, surge pricing raised per-mile and per-minute rates by a certain multiple,  adjusted every few minutes. Uber claimed that drivers earned $15–$30 per hour.13 Fares varied by  service, so drivers could, for example, earn more per ride for UberBLACK than UberX, although they  might receive fewer requests for the higher-paying rides. Drivers could sign up to provide different  types of Uber services, depending on their vehicle and what they thought would be most profitable.14 

Corporate Finance  

From early on, Uber was backed by substantial capital investments. In 2010, Uber received its first  angel investment of $1.25 million, followed by series A and B rounds led by Benchmark Capital, Menlo  Ventures, and Goldman Sachs. By 2012, the company was worth $330 million.15 Uber continued to add  both financial and strategic investors in subsequent rounds and was valued at $60 billion in 2015. By  2018, Uber had raised $21 billion over the course of numerous funding rounds and was the highest 

valued startup in the world at $62 billion.16 In May 2019, the company went public at $41.57 per share;  by year’s end, the share price fell to around $29 and market capitalization stood at about $50 billion.17  

Principled Confrontation 

From its inception, Kalanick operated Uber by the motto growth above all else, with an ask for  forgiveness, not for permission mentality when it came to expansion into new markets and interactions  with regulators and competitors.18 It was the same mindset he had brought to two previous startups  that pushed cultural and legal boundaries: the early file-sharing tool, Scour, which was sued for $250  billion by entertainment-industry companies, and Red Swoosh, another peer-to-peer tech company  that was eventually acquired by content-delivery giant Akamai.19 As early as 2010, Uber clashed with  San Francisco and California transportation authorities over its lack of a proper taxi license.20 In  response to regulators, then-CEO Ryan Graves wrote in a blog post: 

UberCab is a first to market, cutting edge transportation technology and it must be  

recognized that the regulations from both city and state regulatory bodies have not been  

written with these innovations in mind. As such, we are happy to help inform the  

regulatory bodies on this new generation of technology [. . .] Our commitment is to  

facilitate an improved transportation option that provides safe, reliable, and convenient  

travel. That will not change. We will continue full speed ahead with the mission of making  

San Francisco city a great place to live and travel.21  

The company soon removed the word Cab from its name and rebranded as Uber, without changing  strategy.22 Over the next decade, Uber regularly clashed with regulators in markets from Boston to Las  Vegas in the U.S. and, worldwide, from Colombia, to China, to Ghana, and beyond.  

Often, disputes centered on Uber’s definition of itself as a technology firm, not a transportation  company. Uber did not own vehicles nor employ drivers, but rather provided a platform that riders  and drivers used to connect with one another. The company frequently began operating in markets  without obtaining transportation licenses or meeting regulatory standards required of typical taxi  operators. According to one writer, “Uber developed an aggressive expansion technique called  ‘principled confrontation’ in which Uber simply began operating in a city or region until being told  that it didn’t have permission to do so. At that point the firm would mobilize public support for its  service, using an array of lobbyists, followed by a political campaign to change the local regulations.”23  

Uber took a similarly confrontational approach with existing taxi operators. It subsidized drivers  aggressively and offered steep discounts to customers in new locales in order to gain market share.  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Backed by venture capital, Uber could afford to outspend many competitors and typically sent advance  teams to new cities before launching in order to recruit drivers and quickly gain the scale necessary to  reliably match the number of riders and drivers using the platform. Uber’s tactics led to passionate and  at times violent opposition from competitors in the form of massive taxi-driver strikes, protests,  political lobbying, and physical attacks on Uber drivers and passengers. In some cases, regulators  required Uber to stop operations, or Uber simply chose to exit from markets (see Exhibit 5). 

Culture Problems at Uber 

As Uber expanded, it faced challenges and bad publicity centered on privacy and user data, the  safety and reliability of the rideshare model, and its corporate culture. In 2014, the press reported on a  feature colloquially called “Creepy Stalker View,” which allowed Uber employees to track individual  users by GPS.24 In 2017, a blog post by former Uber engineer Susan Fowler accused the company of  having a misogynistic culture. In response, Uber commissioned an investigation headed by former U.S.  Attorney General Eric Holder, whose report detailed a toxic corporate culture and recommended that  Kalanick’s responsibilities be lightened.25 These problems, along with pressure from key investors and  mounting legal challenges in various markets, led to Kalanick’s resignation in June 2017.26 In August  2017, Dara Khosrowshahi, previously CEO of Expedia, became Uber’s chief executive.27 

In 2019, Uber employed more than 22,000 engineers, data scientists, designers, marketers, product  managers, product operations managers, and other corporate workers.28 However, media reporting  continued to identify past and ongoing incidents of sexual harassment, use of threatening and bigoted  language at the highest corporate levels, lack of responsiveness to internal allegations of racial  discrimination, failure to address thousands of reports of sexual assault involving drivers and  passengers, an endemic lack of corporate transparency, and other issues.29 Ahead of its spring 2019  IPO, Uber identified cultural issues as an investment risk, acknowledging, “Our workplace culture and  forward-leaning approach created significant operational and cultural challenges that have in the past  harmed, and may in the future continue to harm, our business results and financial condition.”30 

New York, U.S.A 

Initial Launch and Motivation 

In May 2011, Uber began operating in New York City, its first market beyond Silicon Valley. With  more than 18 million residents in the metro area, New York was the most populous city in the U.S. and  boasted a robust public transportation system that included subway, bus, and rail. Taxi licensing was  regulated, meaning each taxi required a city-issued medallion. Between the 1930s and 1990s, the city  did not release any new medallions, and by 2011 some medallions auctioned by the city sold for more  than $1 million each.31 Investment firms typically owned medallions and leased them to independent  operating companies or individual taxi drivers, who paid $1,000 annual medallion renewal fees.32 Regulators also set meter rates, with an initial flat fee plus per-mile, wait-time, and other charges.  

In 2011, around 13,000 medallion taxis operated in New York, along with limousines, ambulettes,  and hired car services that charged by the hour.33 However, many taxis were in poor repair or unclean,  and service quality varied. Only some taxis accepted credit cards or had GPS, and finding cabs at  certain times of day and in certain locations was challenging.34 Prior to Uber’s arrival, more than 1,000 

New Yorkers had already signed up for the app. “We decided to respond to the demand. We were  coming to New York eventually—why not now?” said Kalanick.35 At the time, Uber charged a base fee  of $8 for each ride, plus an incremental amount based on time, distance, and speed of the ride.36 The  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

minimum cost of the black car service was $15 per ride, which included the tip for the professional  livery driver, and fares worked out to around 1.75x as much as a similar ride using a traditional taxi.37  

Reaction by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators 

New York’s existing transportation options were generally considered more convenient than those  in the Bay Area. However, a majority of New Yorkers owned smartphones, and, with no existing  rideshare or e-hailing culture, Uber experienced several years of nearly unrestricted growth. By 2015,  there were 78,000 for-hire vehicles in New York, about 20,000 of which were affiliated with Uber.38 

From 2014 to 2015, Uber’s share of all for-hire and taxi pickups in New York City increased from 4% to  15%, while the overall number of pickups remained level.39 By 2015, Uber’s encroachment on the  incumbent taxi industry led to a decline in medallion prices, to around $740,000.40  

As Uber and other app-based ridesharing services increased their presence, New York’s existing  operators and city authorities pushed back. Mayor Bill de Blasio claimed in a 2015 opinion article that  Uber drivers were in part responsible for New York’s growing congestion and traffic problems.41 He  wrote that ridesharing drivers were less efficient than taxis, completing an average of eight rides per  day, compared with 32 by the average medallion taxi.42 Meanwhile, taxi drivers—and their financial  backers, who owned or financed the medallions—brought and lost a lawsuit against Uber in New York  State court. Uber also faced a variety of other legal, political, and public relations challenges. An  industry advocate referred to Uber’s ascendance as “a catastrophe,” claiming, “[the] entire [taxi]  industry continues to be illegally destroyed, while elected officials allow it to happen on their watch.”43 

In 2015, de Blasio championed a bill that would limit the number of registered Uber cars allowed in  Manhattan and impose a minimum wage for drivers. Uber responded aggressively, spending over $3.2  million in ads opposing the proposed regulations.44 Uber also added a satirical feature—called the “de  Blasio” option—that warned riders of 25-minute wait times if the mayor’s plan was enacted.45 In July  2015, de Blasio tabled the bill, but in 2018 the city council passed many of the same regulations, making  New York the first major U.S. city to strictly regulate Uber.46 The city issued a freeze on the number of  new rideshare cars licensed to operate (the total was around 100,000), imposed a mandatory $17-per hour minimum wage for drivers, restricted the amount of time drivers were allowed to spend on the  road while waiting to pick up new riders, and introduced a new company license that large firms like  Uber would have to renew each year by submitting detailed financial and operating information to the  city.47 As of 2019, both Uber and competitor Lyft were suing the city over the law.48  

Regional Developments 

Uber’s experience in New York City mirrored its confrontations with regulators in other U.S. cities.  For example, in 2016, the city council of Austin, Texas, passed a law requiring strict background checks  for rideshare drivers, including fingerprinting.49 Both Uber and Lyft argued that the requirement  would negatively affect driver sign-ups, and the two companies poured $8 million into political  lobbying to stop the law from going into effect.50 When the new rules were affirmed by a public vote,  both Uber and Lyft left Austin. In 2017, the companies lobbied the state of Texas to institute a  ridesharing licensing regime that would supersede city rules. In 2018, they successfully achieved new  legislation with softer background checks and moved back into Austin. 

In 2018, following protests by drivers, California passed a law making it more difficult to classify  service providers as independent contractors as opposed to employees.51 This meant companies like  Uber and Lyft could be required to treat drivers as employees, offering health insurance, minimum  wage protections, overtime pay, the right to unionize, and other benefits.52 However, in November  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

2020, California voters approved Proposition 22, a ballot measure that reversed the 2018 state law and  allowed gig economy companies to treat workers as contractors rather than employees. Uber, Lyft,  DoorDash, and others spent a combined $200 million in support of Proposition 22 prior to its passage.53 

Bogotá, Colombia 

Initial Launch and Motivation 

In September 2013, Uber arrived in Bogotá, Colombia, a city of eight million residents and the  second Latin American market Uber entered, after Mexico City.54 For four weeks, it did not broadly  announce its presence, making a “quiet landing” by releasing “a secret fleet of cars in Bogotá,” as one  media outlet put it.55 Once Uber had recruited drivers and its presence became widely known, its  popularity soared. Within a year, there were 500 Uber vehicles on the streets of Bogotá, and Uber touted  the launch as its most successful yet.56 An executive later claimed that “users grew four times faster  during our first year here compared with San Francisco’s launch.”57  

Reaction by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators 

When Uber first arrived, Colombia had no e-hailing culture, no existing rideshare companies, and  no relevant regulatory framework—and the incumbent taxi industry in Bogotá was unreliable and  unsafe. Traditional taxi drivers were known to sometimes tamper with meters and take unnecessarily  long routes to increase fares.58 Worse, there were serious safety concerns. In particular, Colombian  riders feared the so-called millionaire’s ride, when an armed taxi driver forced wealthy riders at  gunpoint to withdraw and then hand over large sums from ATMs.59 Bogotá had no subway, and the  crowded bus system closed down at night and was plagued by pickpockets.60 Although Uber rides  initially cost more than taxis, Uber vehicles tended to be better quality, safer, and easier to locate, and  local reporting stated that Uber “carefully investigates potential drivers’ legal records.”61  

Traditional taxi drivers were a powerful constituency and agitated against Uber from the time of its  arrival. The national taxi drivers union objected that taxis faced significant regulations from which  Uber and its peers were exempt. These included the requirement for drivers in Bogotá to obtain a  medallion at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars; the need to renew taxi drivers’ licenses every three  years; and strict restrictions on how many hours per week and on which days taxis were allowed to  operate.62 Taxi drivers also bemoaned that unregulated transportation providers such as Uber and its  rivals did not pay insurance, while regular taxis were required to do so.63  

In 2014, following taxi driver strikes in Medellín, Colombia’s second-largest city, the Ministry of  Transportation banned Uber nationwide.64 Within months, however, it reversed course and announced  the service was legal after all and that the government would establish regulations for rideshare  services.65 Then, in March 2015, the Colombian government cited Uber for operating an unlicensed taxi  service and issued a fine of $140,000.66 In November, the government demanded Uber register as a taxi  company within six months.67 Uber refused. At the time, it had 20,000 drivers giving one million rides  per month to 250,000 regular users across Colombia.68 In addition, Uber now faced competition in the  rideshare market, trailing in third place behind Brazil-based Easy Taxi and homegrown Tappsi.69 Easy  Taxi and Tappsi merged in December of that year.  

By June 2016, the government had cracked down by impounding more than 1,200 Uber vehicles  and fining 47 individual drivers, who also faced suspension of their licenses for up to three years.70 Meanwhile, taxi drivers continued their aggressive and often violent opposition to Uber.71 In one 2016  incident, taxi drivers surrounded and threw rocks at an Uber vehicle for 40 minutes, while a passenger  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

was stuck inside.72 One driver said, “It is not safe to be an Uber driver in Bogotá [. . .].”73 In 2017, taxi  drivers engaged in a major strike in Bogotá, spurred in part by new government requirements to use  GPS devices to track drivers and collect fares (an Uber-style feature that increased driver costs).74  

During 2018–2019, the government continued to send mixed signals. In November 2018, a local  headline stated, “Uber is illegal in Colombia, but nobody cares what the law says.”75 In 2019, Uber had  two million users and 88,000 affiliated drivers in Colombia and paid taxes, but it was not officially  authorized to operate.76 Two government bodies had taken contradictory stances: Colombia’s  technology ministry declared ride-hailing apps legal, while the Ministry of Transportation continued  to prohibit those that did not register as taxi companies.77 In 2019, an Uber executive said, “Colombia  is straggling—it’s the only place in Latin America where Uber operates where there isn’t even an open  conversation about regulation. And we’re not new—we’ve been here more than six years.”78  

As 2019 came to a close, the government responded to a lawsuit brought by taxi drivers against  Uber by once again ordering Uber to halt operations in the country.79 In early 2020, Uber suspended  operations throughout the country for nearly three weeks before bringing the app back online in late  February. Uber claimed its operations complied with Colombian law by helping “users in Colombia  enter contracts with drivers in which they are ‘renting’ the vehicles along with the drivers’ services.”80 

Regional Developments 

In 2019, Latin America was Uber’s fastest-growing market, in part due to the lack of quality  transportation alternatives. One analyst wrote: “In short, transportation and mobility in Latin America  has decayed to the point that for large portions of the population, there are not reliable and safe  transportation options available.”81 Uber’s competitors saw the opportunity, as well, with Spanish  rideshare company Cabify, Greece’s Beat, and China’s Didi entering Latin America by 2019.82  

One success story for Uber, despite initial struggles, was in São Paulo, Brazil. When Uber arrived in  2014, it faced challenges recruiting reliable UberX drivers, leading to safety issues. Then, unrest among  traditional taxi drivers escalated, leading to the beating and kidnapping of drivers who switched to  Uber. In 2016, Uber introduced cash payments, and safety incidents increased even more.83 In response,  Uber built a more visible, accountable presence in São Paulo, including a $70 million office.84 These  efforts helped reduce incidents and may have improved public perception as ridership increased.85 

Delhi, India 

Initial Launch and Motivation 

In 2014, when Uber entered India, the country was home to a wide range of existing taxi options,  from motorized and bicycle rickshaws to luxury vehicles serving a total of 50 million riders per day.86 Smartphones were not as common as in more developed markets, and credit card use was also less  widespread. The 1988 Motor Vehicles Act (MVA) did not directly regulate the supply of taxis via a  licensing system, although it gave Indian states wide latitude to set rules for taxi supply and permitting,  fare maximums and minimums, working hours and conditions for drivers, and other features.87 Still,  taxi supply remained largely unrestricted, leading to consolidation and domination of the industry by  a few key players, including homegrown rideshare service Ola Cabs.  

Uber debuted in 18 Indian cities in 2014, including Delhi, the nation’s capital and a city of roughly  18 million inhabitants.88 To recruit drivers, Uber offered free smartphones and cash bonuses.89 Car  ownership was not widespread, so drivers frequently rented or purchased vehicles, including via  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Uber’s own leasing platform, Xchange.90 Some observers wrote that Uber encouraged individuals to  take on too much debt to lease or buy vehicles, and one wrote, “Ridership has grown, but not as quickly  as debt-fueled [Uber] fleets.”91 Indian Uber drivers typically worked full-time schedules, as opposed  to the common practice elsewhere of driving part time using a vehicle the driver already owned.92 In  2015, Uber piloted a cash payment system in Hyderabad before rolling it out across the country.93  

Reaction by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators 

India’s national government did not treat rideshare services as taxi companies, which were  regulated, and Uber did not register as a transportation company under the MVA. This raised the question of whether Uber fares ought to be taxed under the country’s mandatory 2% service industry  tax; if fares were considered individual drivers’ revenues, they fell beneath the taxable threshold,  whereas if fares belonged to Uber’s corporate revenues, they would be taxed.94 Regulators also  challenged Uber’s lack of a multi-layered authentication process required for credit card transactions.  While taxi companies complained (and, in some cases, went on strike) in response to Uber and Ola’s  growth and exemption from MVA regulations, they had difficulty convincing officials to curtail  ridesharing apps. This was in part because regulators saw that the apps offered lower prices that  benefitted consumers, while taxi operators had been asking regulators to raise fares annually.95 

In 2015, Delhi’s government banned Uber and all smartphone-based taxi services after an Uber  driver was accused of raping a female passenger.96 Prior to the incident, women had perceived Uber  to be safer than other forms of transportation. Said one female customer in her 20s, “Uber was the one  thing that gave me the confidence to feel independent in Delhi, which you don’t feel here. Now I’m  back to square one.”97 At the time, Uber did not conduct its own background checks, instead relying  on the background checks performed by the government as part of the chauffeur licensing process.98 

As a result of the incident, Delhi city government prohibited Uber from operating in the city pending  the imposition of stringent background checks and the approval of their licenses as taxi operators.  

Despite the ban, both Uber and its competitor Ola continued to operate while applying for an official  taxi operator permit. Delhi impounded 140 vehicles and asked the Information Technology Ministry  to block access to the apps until they had been approved as taxi operators.99 Uber responded by  instituting background checks, installing panic buttons, and creating a feature that allowed a network  of the passenger’s contacts to track their progress. In April 2015, the Delhi High Court lifted the ban,100 

but the government still limited the number of Uber vehicles allowed to operate in the city to 2,500 and  obligated the company to follow a new fare structure that raised its prices.101  

In April 2015, Uber launched UberAuto, a new service for cash-paying riders of auto rickshaws— India’s ubiquitous three-wheeled vehicles.102 Ola already had 16,000 rickshaws on its platform, but  Uber struggled to match Ola’s reach and canceled the service in December 2015.103 In 2016, India’s  Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways issued guidelines that legalized ride-hailing services in the  country while allowing local authorities leeway to set their own regulations.104 In August 2016, Delhi  outlawed surge pricing, which a local leader had termed “daylight robbery.”105 Uber’s compliance with  this price ceiling wavered in the following months.106  

In early 2017, Uber India cut back significantly on driver subsidies to show better performance in  India ahead of Uber’s eventual IPO.107 In 2018, Uber surpassed Ola in terms of app installs, going from  47% download market share in January to 65% in November.108 However, most of these installs were  likely already Ola users becoming dual users.109 As of May 2019, Uber operated in 40 Indian cities and  the Indian market accounted for 11% of Uber rides worldwide.110 By October 2019, Uber India  accounted for 2% of the company’s revenue.111 In 2019, Ola remained the market leader.112 

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

Regional Developments 

The majority of Indian states sought to hold Uber to the same standards as taxi operators.113 Other  regions of India proved to be laboratories of innovation for Uber. The cash payment experiment was  first tried in Hyderabad, prior to being rolled out in other regions, UberBOAT ferry service launched  in Mumbai, and Uber Lite launched for rural areas of the country with inadequate broadband speeds  to support Uber’s traditional app.114 In 2016, Uber launched in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh,  and in 2017, Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, was Uber’s fastest-growing South Asian market.115 By  2017, India was Uber’s largest market after the U.S. by number of trips.116  

Following its arrival in Southeast Asia in 2012, Uber battled in market after market with Singapore based Grab (originally from Malaysia and funded in part by SoftBank) and Indonesian rival Go-Jek  (backed by Google and Tencent). Then, in 2018, Uber sold its Southeast Asia business to Grab, exiting  eight countries.117 After investing $700 million in the region since 2012, Uber received a 27.5% stake in  Grab.118 In 2019, Uber’s share of Grab was worth $3.22 billion.119 In 2019, Uber completed a $3.1 billion  takeover of Dubai-based Careem, which had been valued at $2 billion, giving Uber a significant  foothold in the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, and Turkey.120  

Shanghai, China  

Initial Launch and Motivation 

In 2013, Uber had raised a total of $50 million in capital and had operations in 10 countries—and China loomed as a large and growing untapped market.121 That year, Kalanick returned from a visit to  the country intent on establishing Uber in China’s cities as soon as possible.122 In 2014, Uber officially  launched local operations in Shanghai, claiming at the time that taxi demand in the city was growing  faster than in New York, San Francisco, and Singapore.123 Ridesharing was mostly unregulated in  Shanghai, where traditional taxi licenses cost more than $80,000 and new licenses had not been issued  since the early 1990s.124 Prior to Uber’s arrival, two native firms, Didi Dache (Didi) and Kuaidi Dache (Kuaidi), had established themselves as the dominant operators in the fragmented taxi market by  offering an app-based means of hailing and paying for taxis, as did a number of traditional taxi  operators. As of 2012, Didi was reported to have 80% market share among ride-hailing apps in China.125  

Uber’s entry into China differed from its expansion into other countries up to that point. In its efforts  to avoid some of the stumbling blocks other companies had encountered when entering the Chinese  market, Uber courted local partners and government entities.126 For the first time, the company  established a local subsidiary in a foreign market: Uber China.127 Uber reportedly hoped that forming  a local entity would ease its ability to raise local capital and avoid the bureaucratic hassles foreign  companies operating in China often faced.128 In addition, when Uber launched in Shanghai, it  contracted with a local rental-and-driver service rather than contracting with individual vehicle  owners, as it had done in other markets.129  

Reaction by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators  

Nevertheless, Uber encountered obstacles. For example, the Uber app relied on Google Maps, which  was not widely available in China. It took the better part of 2014 for Uber to forge a partnership with  Baidu, China’s leading search engine, to gain access to local mapping services.130 Another challenge  was Uber’s requirement that customers validate their credit card information to use the app, since  Chinese consumers primarily used WeChat and AliPay—not credit cards—for transactions. In 2014,  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Uber negotiated a deal with AliPay in time for its Shanghai launch.131 Complicating matters was the  fact that both WeChat and AliPay were affiliated with conglomerates that controlled Didi and Kuaidi. 

Following its entry into Shanghai, Uber came out with People’s Uber, which allowed individuals  who had cleared a background check and could provide their own vehicles to drive and offer rides to  customers using the app. In 2015, media reported that “affluent and cosmopolitan Chinese have flocked  to Uber’s service,” which on average cost 35% less than traditional taxi fares.132 In addition, Uber  drivers gained a reputation for more professional comportment and more luxurious vehicles than  traditional taxi operators, along with offering amenities like free bottled water.133 

At the same time that Uber was trying to gain a foothold in Shanghai, Didi and Kuaidi were  competing fiercely for market share, spending hundreds of millions of dollars on generous subsidies  to drivers and riders.134 Then, in February 2015, the two competitors merged to become Didi Chuxing  (Didi), valued at $28 billion and boasting more than one million drivers in 360 Chinese cities.135 The  merged entity launched a rival product to People’s Uber that summer.136 In September 2015, Didi  Chuxing invested $100 million in Lyft, Uber’s main U.S. competitor, and both Lyft and Ola, the  ridesharing market leader in India, joined Didi’s global network.137 Over the next few years, Didi  continued to sink hundreds of millions of dollars per year into driver subsidies and rider discounts.138 In response, Uber subsidized drivers as well, often taking a loss on trips in order to pay drivers rather  than charging its standard 25% fee, while also losing revenue by offering free trips to new riders.139  

In January 2015, China’s Ministry of Transport prohibited privately-owned vehicles from offering  ridesharing services, instituting fines exceeding $16,000 and threatening detention.140 Nevertheless,  Uber continued operations, claiming that its platform was leading to the creation of more than 60,000  jobs per month in China.141 As of 2016, Uber was operating in more than 50 cities and planned to  expand to 120 by September (by comparison, Didi operated in more than 400 Chinese cities).142 

In 2016, after years of intense competition, Didi acquired Uber’s China arm. Didi invested $1 billion  in Uber, and Uber took an 18% stake in Didi, while each company’s CEO was granted a seat on the  other’s board.143 Observers speculated that Uber’s decision was motivated in part by regulations  passed that year by the Chinese government that included several provisions threatening Uber’s  operations, including: (1) granting the government access to all Uber user data; (2) requiring Uber and  competitors to phase out subsidies and charge “market prices,” except when the government  intervened on pricing; (3) granting the national and provincial governments the right to allow or ban  individual rideshare companies; and (4) permitting local governments to issue/deny licenses to  individual drivers.144 According to final regulations released in November 2016, “Chinese Uber and  Didi drivers [must] have 3 years of experience, be licensed by a local taxi regulator, and have no  criminal record. Cars used must have no more than 370,000 miles (600,000 km) driven to be eligible.”145  

One observer wrote, “Where the Chinese state steps in is where entrepreneurship goes to die. In  selling its Chinese business to Didi Chuxing, Uber is getting out of its China operations at the right  time and at a reasonable price.”146 Didi had signaled intentions to hold an IPO possibly within 2018,  which would be a first among ride-sharing companies.147 Over three years in China, Uber invested  (lost) $2 billion in ride subsidies and infrastructure, but it never surpassed 30% market share and was  unable to maintain share once subsidies were dialed back.148  

Regional Developments 

In Japan, Uber delayed launching until 2018 because of the country’s laws against unlicensed taxi  driving. In 2018, unable to launch UberX or any of its privately-owned vehicle offerings, Uber (and  Didi) launched in Japan in partnership with existing taxi companies; by 2019, Uber operated in 14  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

Japanese cities.149 In South Korea, where Uber first appeared in 2013, its success was hampered by  longstanding laws limiting use of non-commercial vehicles for commercial purposes, reluctance by taxi  regulators to expand the taxi supply, and intense pushback from taxi drivers, including strikes and two  cases of drivers’ self-immolating in protest.150 

Accra, Ghana 

Initial Launch and Motivation 

In 2013, Uber debuted in Africa with its launch in Johannesburg, South Africa.151 Its June 2016 entry  into Accra, Ghana—the nation’s capital and, at more than 2.2 million residents, its largest city—marked  the ridesharing company’s 13th launch in an African city.152 The entry was bookended by launches in  Kampala, Uganda, the week prior and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the following week.153 Accra’s taxi  industry was mostly unregulated, and most cars were owned by individuals, with a few larger taxi  companies and motorcycle taxis. In addition, shared van taxis called tro-tros, which were privately  owned and rented to operators, plied set routes, and sometimes held up to 20 passengers, who paid  cash.154 The Ghana Private Road Transport Union of the Ghana Trade Unions Congress licensed tro tro and taxi drivers and vehicles; licensed taxis were painted a traditional yellow and sported yellow  license plates. Taxi owners and drivers paid taxes, and haggling over fares was common, but there  were no limits on the number of taxi licenses.155  

Uber followed its typical tactics of offering rider discounts and driver subsidies in order to quickly  gain market share, giving away up to six free rides when new Accra riders downloaded and registered  with Uber.156 As it had recently done in South Africa, Uber allowed cash payments upon its launch in  Ghana.157 Due to the predominance of cash transactions, Uber established a system in which drivers  were required to create bank accounts to deposit Uber’s 25% share of each fare.158 However, within a  year, media reports described widespread fraud, with drivers picking up passengers and then  convincing them to cancel the trip and pay the driver directly, so it appeared to Uber that the driver  never gave the passenger a ride nor collected a fare; in other cases, drivers completed the trip but failed  to officially begin the ride via the app, or simply claimed to have forgotten the trips took place.159 

Reactions by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators 

Ghana’s transportation industry was highly fragmented and lightly regulated. A June 2016 headline declared, “Uber will pretty much regulate itself in Ghana,” as the company and Ghana’s Ministry of  Transport agreed to a statement of understanding that gave the ridesharing platform significant input  into a “new, forward-looking regulatory framework.”160 In practice, this meant that Uber had latitude  to set its own prices.161 As of 2018, traditional taxi drivers in Accra were constrained by government set prices that were collectively negotiated twice yearly with the Ghanaian Federation for Private Road  Transport, a taxi union.162 When 2018 negotiations stalled due to fluctuations in gas prices and failure  to keep up with inflation, taxi drivers went on strike.163 Ghanaian trade, employer, and labor  organizations united in their protest of Uber’s practices and alleged unfair regulatory advantages. 

Unlike with taxis, Accra authorities allowed Uber drivers to register their cars as private vehicles  with white license plates, allowing them to enter areas, such as hotels, where commercial vehicles were prohibited.164 In January 2018, taxi drivers petitioned the government to order Uber cars to be visibly  marked and to have police arrest anyone operating a taxi without proper insignia.165 On April 25, 2018,  Accra Uber drivers held a sit-down strike to protest the size of Uber’s share of each fare.166 At the  beginning of 2019, regulators in Ghana required Uber cars to identify themselves with insignia on the  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

outside of the vehicle, be individually licensed and insured, and have their cars inspected twice a year  like commercial vehicles.167  

Regional Developments 

In 2016, Uber made a concerted push to expand operations throughout Africa. Like Ghana, South  Africa’s taxi market was fragmented and featured a regulatory vacuum around ridesharing. In 2019,  notwithstanding regulations requiring licensing and permits for rideshare drivers, Uber remained  South Africa’s rideshare leader.168 In 2016, Uber encountered competition in Kenya when Little Cab,  launched by major telecom company Safaricom, entered the market and allowed users to pay for rides  on Safaricom’s commonly used payment platform. In 2019, Little Cab and Uber had similar market  shares in Nairobi.169 Meanwhile, in 2016, Nigeria adopted legislation that incorporated ridesharing into  the country’s transport infrastructure to remain open “to all future smart mobility innovations.”170 

Throughout the continent, Uber faced stiff and sometimes violent opposition from incumbent taxi  operators and drivers. One report wrote, “Uber drivers have been targets of violent attacks in Cairo  and Nairobi, and in South Africa the company resorted to hiring a local private security firm to aid  drivers in emergency situations.”171 In 2017, a 40% price cut by Uber in Lagos led to driver strikes.  Many defected for Estonian competitor Taxify, which had launched in Accra in 2017 and took 15% of  each fare as its fee, compared to Uber’s then-rate of 25%.172 As of 2018, in Kenya, Nigeria, and South  Africa, there were reports of Uber drivers being threatened with violence or attacked by traditional taxi  drivers.173 In June 2016, Uber operated in five Sub-Saharan countries.174 

London, United Kingdom 

Initial Launch and Motivation 

London featured one of the most robust and oldest regulated taxicab industries in the world. The  city was home to two main types of taxis: black taxis and private hire vehicles. The venerable black  taxis—also called hackney carriages or black cabs, although they could be any color—could be either  pre-booked or hailed from the street or at taxi stands. Their professional drivers possessed The  Knowledge, meaning they had passed a rigorous examination proving exhaustive knowledge of  London’s 60,000 streets and 100,000 landmarks, large and small.175 TfL regulated black taxi metered  fares and licenses, but since the 1980s the number of hackney licenses had risen only slightly, to just  over 20,000, even as London had grown by two million residents and its economy had doubled in  size.176 There were also nearly 60,000 private-hire vehicles, run by 3,000 operators, which included  minicabs, limousines, and chauffeured cars.177 TfL licensed private hire vehicles, which had to be pre booked and give passengers accurate fare estimates prior to trips, for £250 per license.178  

In 2012, after two years of planning, Uber came to London, making it the ridesharing company’s  11th market.179 Uber began by recruiting drivers and establishing a user base ahead of the 2012 Summer  Olympics, which London was preparing to host in July–August.180 To attract drivers, Uber at first  offered £25 per hour just to be active on the Uber platform, even if the driver did not get any rides.181 

In May, Uber applied for and received its first permit from TfL, and by June about 50 professional  livery drivers were using Uber’s platform to offer high-end, black car service on the streets of  London.182 (Meanwhile, an existing ridesharing service, Hailo, had signed up 9,000 black taxi  drivers.)183 Soon, though, Uber’s popularity increased, and the platform began operating at full  capacity on weekend evenings. More drivers signed up as word began to spread that the platform  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

offered competitive earnings, gave drivers control of their own schedules, and eliminated the need to  depend on notoriously petty, often corrupt London dispatchers or deal with cash transactions.  

Reaction by Consumers, Competitors, and Regulators 

In 2013, Uber rolled out UberX. Within six months, 4,000 drivers signed up, and riders flocked to  the platform’s lower prices.184 One later report about the period stated, “A 20-minute, two-mile trip in  a black cab costs £14. An Uber will get you there for £8.”185 In 2014, Uber introduced UberPOOL, an  even lower priced option that was about 25% cheaper than UberX, for passengers to share a ride if they  were traveling in the same direction. The same year, Uber switched to paying drivers exclusively via  commission, and drivers continued to sign up—two-thirds of them referred by a friend.186 From 2012  through 2014, the number of licensed minicab operators rose 25%, to 13,000, and in August 2014  minicabs were forced to cut prices to compete with UberX.187 In 2015, the number of Uber drivers  passed the number of black cab drivers and reached 25,000.188  

By 2014, Uber was receiving intense pushback from local regulators and competitors. TfL had  initially licensed Uber as a private hire operator and did not regulate its prices, but black cab drivers  objected that Uber ought to be regulated under the same taximeter license that they were, rather than  a minicab license.189 As an iconic institution of the city, black cab drivers wielded considerable political  leverage and were reported to have outsize lobbying influence with TfL and the London mayor’s  office.190 “TfL was never completely happy with Uber. It didn’t entirely fit the existing regulations,  which is not surprising as it’s a new business model,” one TfL official later said. “It also became the  cause of an increasing congestion problem for TfL.”191 In the summer of 2014, as London and national  authorities considered the question of Uber’s regulatory status, between 4,000 and 10,000 taxi drivers  joined protests across Europe in opposition to Uber, blockading traffic on several occasions.192 That  same summer, Uber downloads surged 850%.193  

In 2015, the U.K. High Court ruled that Uber could continue operating under its existing license.194 Later that year, TfL proposed regulations perceived to be aimed at Uber, including mandatory five minute wait times before any livery driver picked up a passenger, and the locking-in of fares at the  time bookings were made.195 In 2016, according to reports, “a British tribunal ruled that Uber could no  longer treat its drivers as self-employed contractors and would have to meet tougher labor standards,  including offering holiday pay and pensions.”196 Uber agreed to conduct background checks on  drivers, as were required of hackney drivers, and make other changes.197 

Despite Uber’s promises to meet regulatory requirements, TfL did not renew its license when it  expired in 2017, citing safety concerns and poor oversight of drivers.198 The agency stated that Uber  was not “fit and proper,” using a strong British term for an enterprise’s failure to meet standards.199 Uber appealed while continuing to operate, securing a provisional 15-month license, which was set to  expire on September 30, 2019.200 At the time, the company claimed to have 3.5 million riders in London,  along with 40,000 drivers, which rose to about 45,000 drivers by 2019.201 TfL claimed in mid-2019 that  the provisional licensure had led to Uber’s “improving its culture and governance,” but not enough to  warrant a multi-year license renewal.202  

On October 1, 2019, TfL granted Uber a two-month reprieve, but when the extension expired on  November 25, TfL declined to renew Uber’s license.203 TfL stated that Uber “placed passengers and  their safety at risk” by allowing unauthorized rideshare drivers to pick up and transport riders on at  least 14,000 occasions.204 A TfL press release concluded that Uber “is not fit and proper at this time,”  and said the agency “does not have confidence that Uber has a robust system for protecting passenger  safety.”205 Uber was allowed to continue operating while it appealed the decision or until it made  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

changes to meet TfL requirements. On September 28, 2020, Uber won its appeal and was allowed to  resume its London operations with a new 18-month license. The judge wrote that, “despite historical  failings,” Uber had taken steps to improve its safety and that he was “satisfied that they are doing what  a reasonable business in their sector could be expected to do, perhaps even more.”206  

Despite the extension, regulatory authorities were not planning to leave Uber alone. Shortly after  the license was extended, the U.K.’s Competition Markets Authority launched an investigation into  Uber’s planned acquisition of Autocab, which provided Uber-like services to taxis, for “possible effects  on competition.”207  

Regional Developments 

In 2014, when Uber introduced its UberX (called UberPOP) service in Germany, the company  struggled and ran afoul of German chauffeur laws, which required a specific type of driver’s license to  transport passengers commercially.208 In 2015, a regional court banned UberPOP throughout Germany,  although UberBLACK and UberTAXI—which allowed existing taxi-operator and rental-car operators  to use the Uber platform—were allowed to continue operating in the country.209 In 2016, Uber shut  down its Frankfurt offices. Then, in 2017, Uber suffered another blow when the European Court of  Justice declared that Uber was subject to EU member countries’ local transportation regulations, not  exempted under the classification of a technology company.210 In 2019, Uber suspended service in  Barcelona and other cities in Spain in response to new regional regulations that included mandatory  15-minute lag times between when a rider ordered a taxi and when that rider was picked up.211 

Conclusion 

As 2020 drew to a close, Uber reported $6.9 billion in losses over the 12 months prior to its latest  filing, continuing the negative trend in profitability since it began publicly reporting (see Exhibits 6  and 7).212 Nevertheless, Khosrowshahi expressed optimism about the company’s trajectory.213 Uber  announced that it projected it would reach profitability in 2021.214 As Uber battled competitors across  the globe, all ridesharing platforms faced a changing and challenging regulatory landscape, as 

governments and regulators attempted to maintain fair competition in taxi and transportation markets  (see Exhibit 8). A 2019 report on regulatory strategies in 13 cities around the world detailed a variety  of rules already in place or being contemplated. These included requirements for ridesharing  companies to submit data on rides to city governments, fees on ridesharing companies to support  public infrastructure, vehicle emissions requirements, caps on the total number of vehicles, restrictions  on where ridesharing vehicles can operate, including at airports, and regulations relating to drivers’  rights and pay, among others.215 

Given the challenges and confrontations in London and other markets, Uber faced the question of  which strategy would bring long-term success and profitability. Would the company have to adapt its  business model and approach to competing in new and existing markets to comply with regulators?  How long could Uber go without turning a profit before investors began to question the company’s  strategy? Under scrutiny from shareholders and regulators, what strategy would lead Uber to  profitability in transportation markets around the globe? 

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  Exhibit 1 Selection of Uber Markets Mentioned in the Case Study, as of 2019 

Market 

Uber Entry 

Population 2010  (metro; in  

millions) 

Population 2019  (metro; in  

millions) 

Taxi Fares /  Pricing  

Regulated  

Taxi Supply  Regulated  

San Francisco, U.S. 2010 3.3 3.3 Yes Yes New York, U.S. 2011 18.4 18.8 Yes Yes Chicago, U.S. 2011 8.6 8.9 Yes Yes Paris, France 2011 10.5 11.0 Yes Yes Boston, U.S. 2011 4.2 4.3 Yes Yes Toronto, Canada 2012 5.5 6.1 Yes Yes London, U.K. 2012 8.0 9.2 Yes Yes Singapore 2013 5.1 5.8 – – Seoul, South Korea 2013 9.8 10.0 Yes Yes Mexico City, Mexico 2013 20.1 21.7 – Yes Taipei, Taiwan 2013 23.2 23.8 Yes – Johannesburg, South Africa 2013 4.3 5.6 – – Bogotá, Colombia 2013 8.4 10.8 – Yes Medellín, Colombia 2013 3.4 4.0 Yes – Dubai, United Arab Emirates 2013 1.9 2.8 Yes – Delhi, India 2014 22.0 29.4 Yes Yes Hyderabad, India 2014 7.5 9.7 Yes – Barcelona, Spain 2014 4.9 5.5 Yes Yes Frankfurt, Germany 2014 0.7 0.8 Yes Yes Shanghai, China 2014 20.3 26.3 Yes – Mumbai, India 2014 18.3 20.2 Yes Yes São Paulo, Brazil 2014 19.7 21.9 – – Austin, US. 2014 1.4 2.0 Yes Yes Las Vegas, U.S. 2014 1.9 2.6 Yes Yes Cairo, Egypt 2014 16.9 20.5 – – Tokyo, Japan 2015 36.9 37.4 Yes Yes Nairobi, Kenya 2015 3.2 4.6 Yes Yes Dhaka, Bangladesh 2016 14.3 20.3 Yes – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 2016 3.9 6.4 – – Accra, Ghana 2016 2.1 2.5 – – Yangon, Myanmar 2017 4.4 5.2 – Yes Kampala, Uganda 2017 2.0 3.1 – – 

Source: See endnote 216 for source information.216 

Note: Dashes indicate no regulation. 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Exhibit 2 Uber Revenues, by Region, $U.S. Millions, 2016–2019  

2016 2017 2018 2019 

United States and Canada 2,373 4,367 6,521 8,805 Latin America 523 1,645 2,002 1,947 Europe, Middle East, and Africa 659 1,157 1,721 2,148 Asia Pacific 289 763 1,026 1,247 Total Revenue 3,844 7,932 11,270 14,147 

Source: Uber Technologies, Inc., form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, https://bit.ly/3qQd1gl, accessed  January 2021.  

Exhibit 3 Uber Product Types, 2018 

Type Launched Description
l s o n o o p i t r p a C O	Express 2018 Matches riders going in the same direction; requires riders to walk to/from their pick-up and  drop-off points and wait a few minutes to be matched
	UberPOOL 2014 Matches riders going in the same direction; offers door-to-door rides with no walking or waiting
y s m n o o i n t o p c O E	UberX 2012 Provides private, affordable rides for 1–4 people; Uber’s core economy product
	UberXL 2014 Provides private, affordable rides for up to 6 people
	UberSelect 2015 Provides private rides for 1–4 people with a highly rated driver
s m n u i o i t m p e r O P	UberBLACK 2010 Uber’s original ride option; Provides private rides in high-end black cars with professional  drivers for 1 to 4 people
	UberSUV 2015 Provides private rides in luxury SUVs for up to 6 people
	UberLUX 2014 Provides private rides in high-end cars for 1–4 people; Uber’s most luxurious option
g n i s r   n a n o h i o t s p N e d O i R	Uber Eats 2014 Uber’s meal order-and-delivery platform
	Uber Freight 2017 Uber’s shipping-and-carrier platform for the logistics industry
	JUMP 2018 Uber acquired this electric-bike sharing startup for dockless e-scooters and e-bikes

 

Source: Casewriter, compiled from: Uber, “Ride,” 2018, https://www.uber.com/ride/, accessed June 2018 in Chiara  Farronato, Alan MacCormack, and Sarah Mehta, “Innovation at Uber: The Launch of Express POOL,” HBS No. 619- 003 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2018).  

Exhibit 4 Uber Rides per Year (billions), 2014–2019  

Source: Compiled from Ellen Huet, “Uber Says It’s Doing 1 Million Rides Per Day, 140 Million in Last Year,” Forbes, December  17, 2014, https://bit.ly/2JAtBgG (for 2014 data); Kia Kokalitcheva, “Uber Completes 1 Billion Rides,” Fortune,  December 30, 2015, https://bit.ly/2Rarhky (for 2015 data); and Uber Technologies, Inc., form 10-K, for the fiscal year  ended December 31, 2019, https://bit.ly/3qQd1gl, accessed January 2021.  

Note: The number of total rides in 2015 was unavailable; however, Uber announced in December 2015 it had completed one  billion trips over the life of the organization.  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

Exhibit 5 Sample of Markets Where Uber Has Exited, Been Banned, or Faced Notable Regulation 

Country Exit, Ban, or Notable Regulation–Date and Notes 

Australia In 2016, Uber left the Northern Territory when regulators demanded a $300 license  

fee per vehicle; in 2018, Uber announced that it would launch in the Northern  

Territory despite the $300-per-vehicle fee due to high demand. 

Brazil In 2015, Rio de Janeiro restricted informal taxi services, including Uber. Uber  

continued operating there, and 2018 national regulations superseded the local ban.  

Bulgaria After operating in the country for two years, in 2015 Uber was banned by the national  government’s Commission for the Protection of Competition. 

Canada In 2012, Vancouver’s Passenger Transportation Board categorized Uber as a  

limousine service, levying a $75-per-ride fee on drivers that effectively kept Uber  

from operating in the market; in late 2019, Uber and other ridesharing services were  

allowed to apply for licenses to operate with no fee following new regulations. 

China In 2016, Uber made a tactical exit from China, selling operations to rival Didi, in  

which it took an 18.8% stake, valued at the end of 2017 at $7.95 billion. 

Denmark In 2017, Uber halted operations in Denmark following the passage of restrictive  

national laws requiring passenger-occupancy sensors and meters in vehicles. 

France Following violent protests by taxi drivers in 2015, Uber suspended UberPOP (the  

equivalent of UberX) in France, although it continued black-car services. In 2016, a  

judge fined Uber €800,000 because UberPop drivers had been unlicensed. 

Germany Since a 2015 court ruling in a case brought by incumbent taxi drivers, Uber has been  required to operate through existing local taxi operators and has been banned from  

offering UberPop/UberX via privately-owned vehicles.  

Hong Kong In 2017, Hong Kong police arrested dozens of Uber drivers for operating without a  

taxi license and without third-party insurance. Uber continued to operate in Hong  

Kong. 

Italy In 2017, a court in Italy ruled in a suit brought by taxi drivers that Uber was engaged  

in unfair competition and banned the app and Uber promotions. 

U.K. In November, 2019, Transport for London declined to renew Uber’s license to  

operate in London; Uber continued to operate during appeal process. 

U.S. Local control of taxi regulation has prevented Uber and competitors from entering  

most of Oregon, with the exception of Portland and other major cities. 

Source: See endnote 217 for source information.217 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Exhibit 6 Uber Income Statement, $U.S. millions, 2016–2020  

For the fiscal period ending December 31, 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 

Revenue 3,845 7,932 10,433 13,000 11,139 Cost of Goods Sold 3,109 5,514 6,302 8,363 6,783  Gross Profit 736 2,418 4,131 4,637 4,356 

Selling General & Admin Expense 2,575 4,564 5,036 7,925 5,899 R&D Expense 864 1,201 1,505 4,836 2,096 Depreciation & Amortization 320 510 426 472 575  Total Operating Expense 3,759 6,275 6,967 13,233 8,570  Operating Income (3,023) (3,857) (2,836) (8,596) (4,214) 

Interest Expense (334) (479) (648) (559) (458) Interest and Investment Income 22 71 104 234 55  Net Interest Expense (312) (408) (544) (325) (403) 

Income/(Loss) from Affiliates 0 0 (42) (34) (34) Currency Exchange Gains (Loss) (91) 42 (45) (40) (128) Other Non-Operating Income (Expense) 208 (129) (428) 199 59  EBT Excluding Unusual Items (3,218) (4,352) (3,895) (8,796) (4,720) 

Restructuring Charges 0 0 0 0 (456) Impairment of Goodwill 0 0 0 0 (100) Gain (Loss) on Sale of Investments 0 0 1,996 2 (1,815) Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets 0 0 3,214 0 204 Asset Writedown 0 (223) (197) 0 (70) Other Unusual Items 0 0 152 327 (23)  EBT Including Unusual Items (3,218) (4,575) 1,270 (8,467) (6,980) 

Income Tax Expense 28 (542) 283 45 (192)  Earnings from Cont. Operations (3,246) (4,033) 987 (8,512) (6,788) 

Earnings of Discontinued Operations 2,876 0 0 0 0  Net Income to Company (370) (4,033) 987 (8,512) (6,788) 

Minority Interest in Earnings 0 0 10 6 20  Net Income (370) (4,033) 997 (8,506) (6,768) 

Pref. Dividends and Other Adj. 0 0 997 0 0  NI to Common Incl Extra Items (370) (4,033) 0 (8,506) (6,768)  NI to Common Excl. Extra Items (3,246) (4,033) 0 (8,506) (6,768) 

Source: Uber, “Income Statement,” accessed via Capital IQ, Inc., a division of Standard & Poor’s, accessed January 2022.  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404  

Exhibit 7 Uber Balance Sheet, $U.S. millions, 2016–2020  

For the fiscal period ending December 31, 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 

ASSETS 

Total Cash, Cash Equivalents, and Short Term Investments 6,296 4,393 6,406 11,313 6,827 Total Receivables 503 926 1,335 1,642 1,537 Prepaid Exp., Restricted Cash, and Other Current Assets 215 1,518 917 970 1,518 Total Current Assets 7,014 6,837 8,658 13,925 9,882 Net PP&E 2,077 1,192 1,641 3,325 3,088 Long Term Investments 5,969 5,969 11,667 11,891 10,131 Goodwill, Other Intangibles, Deferred Charges, Other LT Assets 653 1,428 2,022 2,620 10,151 Total Assets 15,713 15,426 23,988 31,761 33,252 LIABILITIES & EQUITY 

Accounts Payable 280 213 150 272 235 Accrued Expenses 1,227 2,298 3,570 4,514 5,025 Other Current Liabilities 918 1,336 539 853 1,605 

Total Current Liabilities 2,425 3,847 4,259 5,639 6,865 Long Term Debt 3,112 3,338 7,305 5,707 7,680 Long-Term Leases, Non-Current Unearned Rev., Def. Tax, and  

Other Liabilities 3,450 4,588 5,632 5,232 4,953 Total Liabilities 8,987 11,773 17,196 16,578 19,498 Total Pref. Equity 11,322 12,210 14,177 0 0 

Common Stock, Additional Paid In Capital 209 320 668 30,739 35,931 Retained Earnings (4,806) (8,874) (7,865) (16,362) (23,130) Comprehensive Inc. and Other 1 (3) (188) (187) (535) 

Total Common Equity (4,596) (8,557) (7,385) 14,190 12,266 Total Equity (Common Equity + Minority Interest) 6,726 3,653 6,792 15,183 13,754 Total Liabilities & Equity 15,713 15,426 23,988 31,761 33,252 

Source: Uber Balance Sheet accessed via Capital IQ, Inc., a division of Standard & Poor’s, accessed January 2022. 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

Exhibit 8 Selected Data, Uber vs. Competitors, 2018 

February  

Company Founded Primary  Market  

# of Trips in  

2017 # of Drivers # of Riders 

2020  

Valuation  ($U.S. bn)  

$ Raised  

Uber 2009 U.S. 4 billion 3 million 75 million 62 $21 billion Lyft 2012 U.S. 375 million 1.4 million 23 million 13 $4.1 billion 

Didi  

Chuxing 2012 China 7.4 billion 21 million 450 million 52 ~$19 billion Ola 2010 India 6 million/wk  

(2016) 1 million ———– ~10 ~$3 billion 

Grab* 2012 Singapore 1 billion total  

(as of 2017) 2 million 68+ million ~14 $4.1 billion 

Go-Jek 2010 Indonesia ———- 900,000 15  

million/week ~1010 ~$2.1 billion 

Taxify 2013 Europe ———– 500,000 10 million ~1 $177 million Yandex** 2011 Russia 285 million ———- ———– 13 

Source: See endnote 218 for source information.218  

Note: * These numbers are from late 2017, prior to Uber taking an ownership stake in Grab.  

** Yandex is now combined with Uber in some regions. These numbers are from June 2017, just prior to the Uber deal. 

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404 

Endnotes 

1 Helen Chapman, “Uber London Limited found to be not fit and proper to hold a private hire operator licence,” press release  from Transport for London, November 25, 2019, https://bit.ly/2yz6i4I, accessed January 2020. 

2 Chapman, “Uber London Limited [. . .].” 

3 Dara Khosrowshahi (@dkhos), “We understand we’re held to a high bar, as we should be. But this TfL decision is just wrong.  Over the last 2 years we have fundamentally changed how we operate in London. We have come very far — and we will keep  going, for the millions of drivers and riders who rely on us,” Twitter, 6:39 a.m., November 25, 2019, https://bit.ly/3aIQ86N,  accessed January 2020. 

4 Hasan Chowdhury, “What do London’s taxi drivers think about the Uber ban?” The Telegraph Online, November 25, 2019,  https://bit.ly/2V2H85T, accessed via Factiva, January 2020. 

5 Ryan Browne, “Uber granted 18-month London license as judge overturns ban,” CNBC, September 28, 2020,  

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/28/uber-granted-temporary-london-license.html, accessed January 2021. 

6 Uber, “The history of Uber,” Uber website, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/, accessed December 2019. 7 Uber, “Company Info,” https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/, accessed January 2020. 

8 Youngme Moon, “Uber: Changing the Way the World Moves,” HBS No. 316-101 (Boston: Harvard Business School  Publishing, 2017). 

9 Alexia Tsotsis, “Uber Opens Up Platform to Non-Limo Vehicles with ‘Uber X,’ Service Will Be 35% Less Expensive,”  TechCrunch, July 2, 2012, https://tcrn.ch/2UXfB5Y, accessed June 2018 in Chiara Farronato, Alan MacCormack, Sarah Mehta,  “Innovation at Uber: The Launch of Express POOL,” HBS No. 619-003 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2018). 

10 Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber.” 

11 Uber, “Driver Requirements,” https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/requirements/, accessed January 2020. 

12 Uber, “Tracking your earnings,” Uber website, https://ubr.to/3aI03d7, accessed January 2020. 

13 Jonathan Hall and Alan Krueger, “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States,” Uber, January 22, 2015, https://go.aws/2UJD1gh, accessed June 2018, in Chiara Farronato, Alan MacCormack, and Sarah Mehta,  “Innovation at Uber: The Launch of Express POOL,” HBS No. 619-003 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2018). 

14 Chiara Farronato, Alan MacCormack, and Sarah Mehta, “Innovation at Uber: The Launch of Express POOL,” HBS No. 619- 003 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2018). 

15 Harrison Weber, “Timeline: How Uber’s valuation went from $60M in 2011 to a rumored $50B this month,” Venture Beat website, May 10, 2015, https://bit.ly/2UIzcb8, accessed February 2020. 

16 Jillian D’Onfro and Josh Lipton, “Uber Posts Big Sales Jump in First Quarter and Boosts Valuation to $62 Billion,” CNBC,  May 23, 2018, https://cnb.cx/3dT067R; Megan Rose Dickey and Ingrid Lunden, “Uber’s Raising up to $600M in a Secondary  Round at $62B Valuation, Q1 Sales Grew to $2.5B,” TechCrunch, May 23, 2018, https://tcrn.ch/34hpxeY, both accessed June  2018.  

17 Google search result, “NYSE Uber,” accessed December 2019. 

18 Mike Isaac, “Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire,” New York Times, April 23, 2017, http://nyti.ms/2NzKHAG, accessed January  2021. 

19 Alyson Shontell, “All Hail The Uber Man! How Sharp-Elbowed Salesman Travis Kalanick Became Silicon Valley’s Newest  Star,” Business Insider, January 11, 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-travis-kalanick-bio-2014-1, accessed January  2021. 

20 Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber.” 

21 Ryan Graves, “Uber has been served.,” Ubercab blog, October 24, 2010, http://bit.ly/2YgiKja, accessed January 2021.  22 Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber.” 

23 HF, “Uber’s Very Bumpy Road in Germany,” German Way, September 3, 2018, https://bit.ly/2wdXv7n, accessed October  2019.  

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

24 Davey Alba, “A Short History of the Many, Many Ways Uber Screwed Up,” Wired, June 21, 2017, https://bit.ly/2JAvNEW,  accessed October 2019.  

25 Alba, “A Short History of the Many, Many Ways Uber Screwed Up.” 

26 Mike Isaac, “Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O.,” The New York Times, June 21, 2017,  

https://nyti.ms/348wXkF, accessed June 2018 in cited in Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber.”  27 Isaac, “Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O.” 

28 Uber, “Company info,” Uber Newsroom, https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/, accessed December 2019 and  Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber.” 

29 Sarah Todd, “Uber’s IPO is a lesson in the true cost of toxic culture,” Quartz, April 12, 2019, https://bit.ly/3bRp1Xq,  accessed January 2020; Heather Somerville, “Uber Got Thousands Of Assault Reports,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2019. 

30 Todd, “Uber’s IPO is a lesson in the true cost of toxic culture.” 

31 Michael M. Grynbaum, “2 Taxi Medallions Sell for $1 Million Each,” New York Times, October 20, 2011,  

https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/2-taxi-medallions-sell-for-1-million-each/, accessed December 2019. 

32 Cecilia Saixue Watt, “‘There’s no future for taxis’: New York yellow cab drivers drowning in debt,” The Guardian, October  20, 2017, https://bit.ly/2X9VVyE, accessed October 2019. 

33 Grynbaum, “2 Taxi Medallions Sell for $1 Million Each.” 

34 Uber, “Uber NYC has launched,” Uber website, https://ubr.to/2xJrTXH, accessed December 2019.  

35 Jenna Wortham, “With a Start-Up Company, a Ride Is Just a Tap of an App Away,” New York Times, May 3, 2011,  https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/technology/04ride.html, accessed January 2020. 

36 Wortham, “With a Start-Up Company, a Ride Is Just a Tap of an App Away.” 

37 Wortham, “With a Start-Up Company, a Ride Is Just a Tap of an App Away.” 

38 Bill de Blasio, “A fair ride for New Yorkers: How the city should respond to the rapid rise of Uber,” New York Daily News,  July 18, 2015, https://bit.ly/2RatkVM, accessed October 2019.  

39 Reuben Fischer-Baum and Carl Bialik, “Uber Is Taking Millions Of Manhattan Rides Away From Taxis,” FiveThirtyEight,  October 13, 2015, https://53eig.ht/2yAq287, accessed January 2020. 

40 Chris Isidore, “New York City’s yellow cab crisis,” CNN, July 22, 2015, https://cnn.it/2xNM0Eh, accessed January 2020. 41 de Blasio, “A fair ride for New Yorkers.” 

42 de Blasio, “A fair ride for New Yorkers.” 

43 Erik Engquist, “Judge rules on taxi industry lawsuit: Compete with Uber or die,” Crain’s New York Business, September 9,  2015, https://bit.ly/3dTVYEq, accessed January 2020. 

44 Ken Kurson, “Revealed: Uber’s TV Buy Is Gigantic,” Observer, July 22, 2015, https://bit.ly/3aGBsp2, accessed March 2020. 

45 Jenny Che, “Uber, New York City Reach Tentative Truce,” Huffington Post, July 22, 2015, https://bit.ly/2picKZ5, accessed  October 2019.  

46 Che, “Uber, New York City Reach Tentative Truce.” 

47 Aarian Marshall, “New York City goes after Uber and Lyft,” August 8, 2018, Wired, https://bit.ly/3dXgYtZ, accessed March  2020.  

48 Abrar Al-Heeti, “Lyft joins Uber in suing New York City over limits on cruising time,” CNET, October 11, 2019,  https://www.cnet.com/news/lyft-sues-new-york-city-for-cap-on-cruising-times/, accessed June 2020. 

49 Matthew Zeitlin, “How Austin’s failed attempt to regulate Uber and Lyft foreshadowed today’s ride-hailing controversies,”  Vox, September 13, 2019, https://bit.ly/2X9pPmk, accessed October 2019.  

50 Zeitlin, “How Austin’s failed attempt to regulate Uber and Lyft foreshadowed today’s ride-hailing controversies.” 

51 Shirin Ghaffary and Alexia Fernández Campbell, “A landmark law disrupted the gig economy in California. But what  comes next for Uber drivers?” Recode, October 4, 2019, https://bit.ly/3bPJ5JN, accessed October 2019.  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404 

52 Alexia Fernández Campbell, “California just passed a landmark law to regulate Uber and Lyft,” Vox, September 18, 2019,  https://www.vox.com/2019/9/11/20850878/california-passes-ab5-bill-uber-lyft, accessed January 2020; Ghaffary and  Fernández Campbell, “A landmark law disrupted the gig economy in California.” 

53 Shira Ovide, “Uber and Lyft Go Legit. Now What?” New York Times, November 5, 2020,  

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/technology/uber-lyft-gig-work.html, accessed January 2021. 

54 Daniel Raisbeck, “Uber in Colombia Suffers Regulatory Intimidation as Pressure Groups Reign Supreme,” PanAm Post, May  12, 2014, https://bit.ly/2X8bXZN; Emily Stewart, “Uber Quietly Arrives in Bogotá, Keeps Stirring the Pot in the U.S.,” Pulso  Social, September 25, 2013, https://bit.ly/3bIScMq, both accessed December 2019.  

55 Stewart, “Uber Quietly Arrives in Bogotá, Keeps Stirring the Pot in the U.S.” 

56 Raisbeck, “Uber in Colombia Suffers Regulatory Intimidation as Pressure Groups Reign Supreme.” 

57 Chris Kraul and Vincent Bevins, “Ride-sharing apps are booming in Latin America and competition is stiff,” The Los Angeles  Times, December 17, 2015, https://lat.ms/34byA11, accessed December 2019. 

58 Naomi Dalton, “Bogota taxis 101: Everything you need to know,” Matador Network, May 1, 2017,  

https://matadornetwork.com/read/bogota-taxis-101-everything-need-know/, accessed December 2019.  

59 John Otis, “Death Cab for Colombia,” GlobalPost, July 16, 2013, https://bit.ly/2JDR6pd, accessed December 2019.  60 Otis, “Death Cab for Colombia.” 

61 Raisbeck, “Uber in Colombia Suffers Regulatory Intimidation as Pressure Groups Reign Supreme,” and “La guerra de los  taxis,” Semana, May 10, 2014, https://bit.ly/2V3AcFI, both accessed December 2019 

62 “Thousands of Bogota taxi drivers protest Uber, Cabify and higher costs,” Reuters, October 23, 2017,  

https://reut.rs/2Xa2GQM, accessed October 2019; Felipe García Altamar, “El desbalance entre taxis y plataformas de  transporte en Bogotá,” El Espectador, June 22, 2019, https://bit.ly/39HeRqU, accessed December 2019; Sergio Held, “Chinese  company intensifies Colombia’s black market for taxis,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2019, https://bit.ly/2xS5uY4, accessed March 2020.  

63 “Thousands of Bogota taxi drivers stage protest over Uber, Cabify and higher costs,” Reuters.  

64 Emily Dugdale, “Colombia’s taxi drivers on strike, furious over arrival of ride-share company Uber,” Colombia Reports, July  30, 2014, https://bit.ly/348sePI, accessed January 2020. 

65 Dugdale, “Colombia’s taxi drivers on strike, furious over arrival of ride-share company Uber.” 

66 Christopher Woody, “Uber is facing a legal showdown in its fastest-growing market,” Business Insider, June 24, 2016,  https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-crackdown-in-colombia-2016-6, accessed October 2019. 

67 Woody, “Uber is facing a legal showdown in its fastest-growing market.”  

68 Kraul and Bevins, “Ride-sharing apps are booming in Latin America and competition is stiff.” 

69 Kraul and Bevins, “Ride-sharing apps are booming in Latin America and competition is stiff.” 

70 “Conductores de Uber no podrán perder la licencia por 25 años,” El Espectador, September 17, 2019,  

https://bit.ly/39GR8XV, accessed December 2019; Woody, “Uber is facing a legal showdown in its fastest-growing market.” 

71 Rose Lander, “Colombia taxi drivers take aggressive action against Uber competition,” Colombia Reports, September 10, 2015,  https://colombiareports.com/colombia-taxi-drivers-take-unauthorized-action-against-uber/, accessed December 2019.  

72 Oliver Griffin, “Uber’s Colombian speed bumps,” TechCrunch, March 24, 2016, https://tcrn.ch/2JFmF1O, accessed April  2020. 

73 Griffin, “Uber’s Colombian speed bumps.”  

74 “Thousands of Bogota taxi drivers protest Uber, Cabify and higher costs,” Reuters. 

75 Adriaan Alsema, “Uber is illegal in Colombia, but nobody cares what the law says,” Colombia Reports, November 5, 2018,  https://bit.ly/2R5Jno3, accessed October 2019. 

76 “Uber retira inversión de US$40 millones en Colombia por falta de regulación,” El Espectador, October 31, 2019,  https://bit.ly/2x4GHjz, accessed December 2019; Associated Press, “Colombia orders Uber to halt its operations after  lawsuit,” Washington Post, December 20, 2019, https://wapo.st/2Rr68mH, accessed January 2020. 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

77 Nelson Bocanegra, “Drive Me Crazy: Colombia Ride-Hailing Apps, Tech Firms Bristle at Regulations,” Reuters, December  18, 2019, https://reut.rs/2Vv9TZ8, accessed April 2020. 

78 “Drive Me Crazy: Colombia Ride-Hailing Apps, Tech Firms Bristle at Regulations,” Reuters.  

79 Associated Press, “Colombia orders Uber to halt its operations after lawsuit,” Seattle Times, updated December 21, 2019,  https://bit.ly/3a3z9Ln, accessed April 2020. 

80 Associated Press, “Uber Resumes Operating in Colombia After 3-Week Hiatus,” Seattle Times, February 20, 2020,  https://bit.ly/3a7F1n3, accessed April 2020. 

81 Jonathan Moed, “Uber’’’s Wild Ride To Make Latin America Its Fastest Growing Region,” Forbes, December 20, 2018,  https://bit.ly/2V5s1bW, accessed October 2019.  

82 “Uber in Bogota: the big debate!” HowtoBogota, January 11, 2018, https://bit.ly/34lrsiJ, accessed October 2019. 

83 Stephen Eisenhammer and Brad Haynes, “Uber is rethinking cash payments in Brazil after murders and robberies of its  drivers,” Business Insider, February 14, 2017, https://bit.ly/3bSfv6A, accessed February 2020. 

84 Guilherme Tagiaroli, “Brazil’s love affair with Uber has been ruined by kidnapping, robbery, and murder,” Vice, February  25, 2017, https://bit.ly/3aUaLxj, accessed October 2019. 

85 Tagiaroli, “Brazil’s love affair with Uber has been ruined by kidnapping, robbery, and murder.” 

86 Gigi Teo and Sia Siew Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge,” Nanyang  Business School, HBS No. NTU113, May 26, 2017.  

87 Teo and Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge.”  

88 Teo and Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge.” 

89 Aditi Shah, “Exclusive: India considers private cars for ridesharing to cut traffic,” Reuters, July 5, 2017,  

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-ridesharing-exclusive-idUSKBN19Q1MC, accessed December 2019. 

90 Madhura Karnik, “Uber in India is fundamentally different from Uber in the West,” Quartz, March 17, 2017,  

https://qz.com/india/926220/uber-in-india-is-fundamentally-different-from-uber-in-the-west/, accessed December 2019. 

91 Andy Mukherjee, “Uber should worry about the distressed debt behind Indian expansion,” Livemint, March 8, 2017, https://bit.ly/34auDcD, accessed December 2019; Karnik, “Uber in India is fundamentally different from Uber in the West”  

92 Karnik, “Uber in India is fundamentally different from Uber in the West.” 

93 Amar Toor, “Uber begins testing cash payments,” The Verge, May 12, 2015, https://bit.ly/3dWekEQ, accessed March 2020.  94 Teo and Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge.” 

95 Teo and Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge.” 

96 Ellen Barry and Suhasini Raj, “Uber Banned in India’s Capital After Rape Accusation,” The New York Times, December 8,  2014, https://nyti.ms/3aN4OSA, accessed December 2019.  

97 As quoted in Barry and Raj, “Uber Banned in India’s Capital After Rape Accusation.”  

98 Aditi Malhotra and Dhanya Ann Thoppil, “How Uber Works in India,” The Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2014,  https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2014/12/08/how-uber-works-in-india/, accessed December 2019.  

99 Joanna Sugden, “Delhi Requests Block on Uber, Ola Apps,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2015, via ProQuest, accessed  December 2019. 

100 Aditi Malhotra and Joanna Sugden, “Indian Court Lifts Ban on Uber in Delhi,” The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2015,  https://www.wsj.com/articles/indian-court-lifts-ban-on-uber-in-delhi-1436343200, accessed December 2019. 

101 Associated Press, “Uber introduces ‘panic button’ in India,” The Guardian, February 9, 2015, https://bit.ly/2V2sFab,  accessed October 2019; Nitish Kulkarni, “Uber Hits Roadblock In India After Being Denied Permission To Operate In Delhi,”  TechCrunch, September 16, 2015, https://tcrn.ch/34lrKpP, accessed December 2019.  

102 Nida Najar, “Uber Adds a Low-Tech Twist to Its Modern Business Model in India,” The New York Times, April 20, 2015,  https://nyti.ms/2Rr6ud1, accessed December 2019. 

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404 

103 Aditi Malhotra, “Uber Ends Auto Service in Delhi,” The New York Times, December 9, 2015,  

https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/12/09/uberauto/, accessed December 2019. 

104 Pranav Dixit, “Ride-Hailing Services Like Uber And Ola Are Finally Legal In India,” BuzzFeed News, December 21, 2016,  https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/uber-and-ola-are-finally-legal-in-india, accessed December 2019. 

105 Amy Kazmin, “New Delhi bans Uber ‘surge pricing’,” The Financial Times, April 21, 2016,  

https://www.ft.com/content/742d189a-0785-11e6-96e5-f85cb08b0730, accessed December 2019. 

106 Hanibal Goitom, “India’s Regulatory Approach to Uber,” Library of Congress, July 11, 2016,  

https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2016/07/indias-regulatory-approach-to-uber/, accessed December 2019. 

107 Sai Sachin Ravikumar, Aditi Shah, and Aditya Kalra, “As Uber gears up for IPO, many Indian drivers talk of shattered  dreams,” Reuters, May 8, 2019, https://reut.rs/2X8ecfz, accessed October 2019.  

108 Ananya Bhattacharya, “Ola vs Uber: The latest score in the great Indian taxi-app game,” Quartz India, February 12, 2019,  https://qz.com/india/1545042/ola-vs-uber-the-latest-score-in-the-great-indian-taxi-app-game/, accessed October 2019. 

109 Bhattacharya, “Ola vs Uber.” 

110 “Uber India bookings touch $1.6 billion, 11% of global rides: report,” Economic Times, December 5, 2018,  

https://bit.ly/347IEbe, accessed October 2019.  

111 Aditi Shrivastava and Patanjali Pahwa, “Uber India Lays Off 10-15% of its Staff, Ops may be Hit,” Economic Times, October  17, 2019, via ProQuest, accessed December 2019. 

112 Bhattacharya, “Ola vs Uber.” 

113 Goitom, “India’s Regulatory Approach to Uber.” 

114 Bhattacharya, “Ola vs Uber.” 

115 Utsav Agarwal, “The Uber Bangladesh adventure,” Dhaka Tribune, December 19, 2019, https://bit.ly/3aDLIyd; “Uber  drivers in Bangladesh announce strike for Monday against ‘irregularities,’” bdnews24.com, updated October 14, 2019,  https://bit.ly/39EUJWp, accessed February 2020. 

116 Karnik, “Uber in India is fundamentally different from Uber in the West.” 

117 Vindu Goel and Weiyi Lim, “Uber’s Exit From Southeast Asia Upsets Regulators and Drivers,” New York Times, May 28,  2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/technology/uber-grab-southeast-asia.html, accessed February 2020. 

118 Jon Russell, “Southeast Asia exit deal is a win, not a defeat, for Uber,” TechCrunch, March 26, 2018,  

https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/26/southeast-asia-exit-deal-is-a-win-not-a-defeat-for-uber/, accessed February 2020. 

119 Jon Russell, “Uber has already made billions from its exits in China, Russia and Southeast Asia,” TechCrunch, April 12,  2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/11/uber-global-exits-billions/, accessed February 2020. 

120 Heather Somerville, Alexander Cornwell, Saeed Azhar, “Uber buys rival Careem in $3.1 billion deal to dominate ride hailing in Middle East,” Reuters, March 26, 2019, https://reut.rs/3aH4yo4, accessed February 2020. 

121 Leslie Hook, “Uber’s battle for China,” Financial Times weekend magazine online, June 2016, https://ig.ft.com/sites/uber in-china/, accessed December 2019. 

122 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

123 Liu Jiayi, “Uber officially enters China with Shanghai launch,” ZDNet News, February 14, 2014,  

https://www.zdnet.com/article/uber-officially-enters-china-with-shanghai-launch/, accessed December 2019. 

124 Sophia Yan, “Taxi drivers strike in China over steep fees, Uber,” CNN Money, January 14, 2015,  

https://money.cnn.com/2015/01/14/news/china-taxi-strike-uber/index.html, accessed October 2019.  

125 Yue Wang, “Didi Chuxing Faces Stiff Competition in Race to Dominate China’s Ride-Sharing Market,” Forbes, April 11,  2018, https://bit.ly/3aJj0vY, accessed June 2018.  

126 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

127 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

128 Jiayi, “Uber officially enters China with Shanghai launch.” 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

129 Jiayi, “Uber officially enters China with Shanghai launch.” 

130 Teo and Kien, “Uber (B)—Uber in Every Major City in the World: The Globalisation Challenge.” 

131 William C. Kirby, “The Real Reason Uber Is Giving Up in China,” Harvard Business Review, August 2, 2016,  

https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-real-reason-uber-is-giving-up-in-china, accessed December 2019. 

132 Paul Mozur and Mike Isaac, “Uber Spends Heavily to Establish Itself in China,” New York Times online, June 8, 2015,  https://nyti.ms/2JQyN0h, accessed December 2019. 

133 Mozur and Isaac, “Uber Spends Heavily to Establish Itself in China.” 

134 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

135 Ellen Huet, “In Wake Of Kuaidi-Didi Merger, Uber Faces An Even Tougher Battle In China,” Forbes online, March 19, 2015,  https://bit.ly/3bP0SRf, accessed December 2019; Lulu Yilun Chen, “The Uber of China is reportedly worth $28 billion,”  Bloomberg, June 15, 2016, https://mashable.com/2016/06/15/didi-28-billion-valuation/, accessed October 2019. 

136 Jon Russell, “Didi Kuaidi, China’s Dominant Taxi App Firm, Launches Carpooling Service,” TechCrunch, June 1, 2015,  https://tcrn.ch/2RblnA2, accessed April 2020. 

137 Harrison Weber, “China’s DiDi invests $100M in Lyft as two team up to take on Uber worldwide,” Venture Beat, September  16, 2015, https://bit.ly/3bUfjns, accessed February 2020. 

138 Timmy Shen, “Didi Chuxing ends US experiment, encourages users to download Lyft,” Technode, December 1, 2017,  https://bit.ly/2JAyciW, accessed October 2019.  

139 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

140 Yan, “Taxi drivers strike in China over steep fees, Uber.” 

141 Mozur and Isaac, “Uber Spends Heavily to Establish Itself in China.” 

142 Hook, “Uber’s battle for China.” 

143 Alyssa Abkowitz and Rick Carew, “Uber Sells China Operations to Didi Chuxing,” The Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2016,  https://on.wsj.com/2x1ZRXq, accessed June 2018; William C. Kirby, “The Real Reason Uber Is Giving Up in China.”  

144 William C. Kirby, “The Real Reason Uber Is Giving Up in China.” 

145 Michael Gasiorek, “After a $35 Billion Merger, Uber and Didi Are Set to Take Over the Ridesharing Universe,” Inc., August  8, 2016, https://bit.ly/3bMc29m, accessed October 2019.  

146 William C. Kirby, “The Real Reason Uber Is Giving Up in China.” 

147 Julie Steinberg, “Chinese Ride-Hailing Giant Didi Hits Accelerator on Talks for IPO,” The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2018,  https://on.wsj.com/2xR4m7q, accessed June 2018.  

148 William C. Kirby, “The Real Reason Uber Is Giving Up in China.” 

149 Sherisse Pham, “Ride-hailing frenemies Uber and Didi gear up for a big year in Japan,” CNN Business, July 17, 2019,  https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/17/tech/uber-didi-japan/index.html, accessed October 2019.  

150 Joon Young Kwon, “Why Uber is having a hard time in Korea,” Asia Times, September 4, 2019, https://bit.ly/3e4kxyO; Sim  Chang-hyun, “Why Uber is having hard time in Korea,” The Korea Times, April 22, 2018, https://bit.ly/3aIThn7, both accessed  March 2020. 

151 Mayuri Pillay, “Uber in SA — The Road So Far,” Uber newsroom, February 29, 2016, https://www.uber.com/en ZA/newsroom/uber-changing-the-way-sa-moves-one-ride-at-a-time/, accessed February 2020. 

152 Myolisi Sikupela, “Uber launches in Accra, Ghana, its 13th city in Africa,” Memeburn website, June 9, 2016,  

https://memeburn.com/2016/06/uber-launches-ghanas-capital-largest-city-accra/, accessed December 2019. 

153 Sikupela, “Uber launches in Accra, Ghana, its 13th city in Africa”; Eric Wainaina, “Uber Launches Operations in Accra, its  8th City in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Tech Weez website, June 8, 2016, https://bit.ly/2x0GIVG, both accessed December 2019. 

154 Kwame Aidoo, “How to Navigate Transport in Ghana,” Culture Trip, April 19, 2018, https://bit.ly/2V0yHIz; M. Sophia  Newman, “Why a Ride in a Tro-Tro Made Me Think of Uber,” NextCity.org, January 16, 2015, https://bit.ly/2XfG69H, both  accessed March 2020.  

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404 

155 Aidoo, “How to Navigate Transport in Ghana.”  

156 Sikupela, “Uber launches in Accra, Ghana, its 13th city in Africa.”  

157 Sikupela, “Uber launches in Accra, Ghana, its 13th city in Africa.” 

158 Kwame Aidoo, “How Ghanaian drivers may be cheating Uber and car owners,” Pulse.com.gh, May 24, 2017,  

https://bit.ly/2Vr0kuy, accessed December 2019. 

159 Aidoo, “How Ghanaian drivers may be cheating Uber and car owners.” 

160 Yomi Kazeem, “Uber will pretty much regulate itself in Ghana,” Quartz Africa, June 21, 2016, https://bit.ly/34aGmId,  accessed October 2019.  

161 Camilla Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” Africa Is a Country website, April 9, 2018,  

https://africasacountry.com/2018/04/what-is-uber-up-to-in-africa, accessed December 2019. 

162 Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” 

163 Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” 

164 Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” 

165 “Commercial Taxi Drivers protest against Uber,” GhanaLive, January 2018, https://bit.ly/3bRMRSS, accessed March 2020.  166 “Uber drivers on sitdown strike,” GhanaLive, April 25, 2018, https://bit.ly/3bShWWM, accessed October 2019.  

167 “DVLA to regulate operations of Uber, Taxify,” Ghana Business News, November 6, 2018,  

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168 Thando Vilakazi and Shingie Chisoro-Dube, “Two very different responses to Uber – Kenya and South Africa,” The  Conversation, March 13, 2017, https://bit.ly/2x5Id4W, accessed October 2019.  

169 Vilakazi and Chisoro-Dube, “Two very different responses to Uber – Kenya and South Africa.” 

170 Kazeem, “Uber will pretty much regulate itself in Ghana.”  

171 Kazeem, “Uber will pretty much regulate itself in Ghana.”  

172 Bless Quarshie, “Ride Sharing In Ghana: Challenges And Opportunities in 2019 And Beyond,” Bless Quarshie, March 28,  2019, https://bit.ly/2JFXfRS, accessed October 2019; Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” 

173 Houeland, “What is Uber up to in Africa?” 

174 Eric Wainaina, “Uber Launches Operations in Accra, its 8th City in Sub-Saharan Africa.”  

175 The Knowledge, The London Taxi Experience, https://bit.ly/3dVcjc8, accessed January 2020. 

176 Sam Knight, “How Uber conquered London,” The Guardian, April 27, 2016, https://bit.ly/3aL8zIb, accessed January 2020.  

177 Jody Rosen, “The Knowledge, London’s Legendary Taxi-Driver Test, Puts Up a Fight in the Age of GPS,” New York Times,  November 10, 2014, https://nyti.ms/2V5ExIJ, accessed January 2020. 

178 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.”  

179 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

180 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

181 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

182 Knight, “How Uber conquered London”; Tanya Powley, Madhumita Murgia, Robert Wright, and Leslie Hook, “How Uber  and London ended up in a taxi war,” Financial Times, September 28, 2017, https://on.ft.com/2X55BdH, accessed January 2020. 

183 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

184 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

185 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

186 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

187 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

27 

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720-404 Uber: Competing Globally 

188 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

189 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook., “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.”  

190 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook, “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

191 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook, “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

192 Knight, “How Uber conquered London”; Powley et al., “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

193 Knight, “How Uber conquered London.” 

194 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook, “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

195 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook, “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

196 Prashant S. Rao and Mike Isaac, “Uber Loses License to Operate in London,” New York Times, September 22, 2017,  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/uber-london.html, accessed January 2020. 

197 Rao and Isaac, “Uber Loses License to Operate in London.” 

198 Adam Satariano, “Uber Regains Its License to Operate in London, a Win for Its New C.E.O.,” New York Times, June 26, 2018,  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/technology/uber-london.html, accessed January 2020. 

199 Rao and Isaac, “Uber Loses License to Operate in London.” 

200 Powley, Murgia, Wright, and Hook, “How Uber and London ended up in a taxi war.” 

201 Rao and Isaac, “Uber Loses License to Operate in London”; Adam Satariano and Amie Tsang, “Uber Is Fighting to Survive  in London After Losing Its License,” New York Times, January 10, 2020,  

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/business/uber-london.html, both accessed January 2020. 

202 The Associated Press, “London Keeps Uber on Short License as It Scrutinizes Firm,” New York Times, September 24, 2019,  https://nyti.ms/2UEWGxU, accessed February 2020. 

203 Satariano and Tsang, “Uber Is Fighting to Survive in London After Losing Its License”; “Uber’s London licence renewed for  two months,” BBC, September 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49810049, accessed October 2019. 

204 Chapman, “Uber London Limited [. . .]” 

205 Chapman, “Uber London Limited [. . .]” 

206 Gwyn Topham, “Uber granted London licence as court rules it ‘no longer poses a risk,’” The Guardian, September 28, 2020,  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/sep/28/uber-keeps-london-licence-risk-tfl-safety, accessed January 2021. 

207 Kate Beioley, “UK watchdog to investigate Uber’s acquisition of Autocab,” Financial Times, January 29, 2021,  

https://www.ft.com/content/3f580bee-8e1b-4199-b7bf-7bf70c856573, accessed February 2021. 

208 Ben Rooney, “UberPOP banned in Germany,” CNN Money, March 18, 2015, http://bit.ly/2RaIfi, accessed January 2020. 209 Rooney, “UberPOP banned in Germany.” 

210 “Uber’s Very Bumpy Road in Germany,” German Way, September 3, 2018, https://bit.ly/2wdXv7n, accessed March 2020. 211 David Reid, “‘See you later, Barcelona’ — Uber suspends cab service in Spanish city,” CNBC, January 31, 2019,  https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/31/uber-suspends-cab-service-in-spanish-city-of-barcelona.html, accessed October 2019.  

212 Danielle Abril, “Uber promises ‘profit’ milestone this year. Here’s its plan,” Fortune, February 6, 2020,  

https://fortune.com/2020/02/06/uber-q4-2019-profitability-plan/, accessed February 2020. 

213 Abril, “Uber promises ‘profit’ milestone this year. Here’s its plan.” 

214 Heather Somerville, “Uber Books Another Quarterly Loss as Revenue Climbs,” Wall Street Journal, updated November 4,  2019, https://on.wsj.com/3dWh5pG, accessed February 2020. 

215 Meera Joshi, Nicholas Cowan, Olivia Limone, Kelsey McGuinness, Rohan Rao, “E-Hail Regulation in Global Cities,” NYU  Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation, November 2019, https://bit.ly/2UUMQqo, accessed February 2020. 

216 Exhibit 1 populations from mactrotrends.net; Sam Shead, “Uber has pulled out of Frankfurt after its business was crippled  by German regulators,” Business Insider, January 4, 2016, https://bit.ly/3bRNuvI; Ian Mount, “Airbnb Uber under attack in  Barcelona,” Fortune, May 28, 2014, https://bit.ly/2yqXyNR; Hellen Githaiga, “Uber offers free rides in Tanzania debut,” The  East African, June 15, 2016, https://bit.ly/2X9uogs; “Uber pulls up in Japan with taxi-hailing service,” Reuters, May 22, 2018,  https://reut.rs/2V1mFyv; Jon Russell, “Uber drives into Africa after launching its private car service in Johannesburg,” The 28 

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Uber: Competing Globally 720-404 

Next Web, August 8, 2013, https://bit.ly/3efyQAJ; Song Jung-a, “Uber hits brakes on S Korea ride-sharing service,” Financial  Times, March 6, 2015, https://on.ft.com/3aH7bWY; Sarah Feldberg, “After months of waiting, Uber and Lyft launch in Las  Vegas,” Travel Weekly, September 18, 2015, https://bit.ly/2R9yAcz; Robert Grattan, “Uber follows Lyft’s lead, launches in  Austin despite official ban,” Austin Business Journal, June 4, 2014, https://bit.ly/2Rc6FIL; Anthony Carranza and Anne Sewell,  “Uber ordered to stop operating in Colombia,” Blasting News, December 27, 2019, https://bit.ly/3bMev3C; Jon Russell, “Uber  launches in Bangladesh to continue its emerging market push,” TechCrunch, November 22, 2016, https://tcrn.ch/2JGnzLr;  Desmond Ng, “How Uber, valued at billions, was sent packing by a start-up in Singapore,” Channel News Asia, August 19,  2018, https://bit.ly/3bP3Xkh; Leena Rao, “Uber Brings Its Disruptive Car Service To Chicago,” TechCrunch, September 22,  2011, https://tcrn.ch/3aKNxJA; all accessed March 2020. Regulatory information from Samuel R. Staley, Catherine Annis, and  Matthew Kelly, “Regulatory Overdrive: Taxi Regulations, Market Concentration and Service Availability,” Institute for Justice,  October 2018, https://bit.ly/2R9divs; Muwanga Ronald, “Govt planning to ban private ownership of Taxis in Uganda,”  UgandaNZ, July 23, 2019, https://bit.ly/2Rd6UU1; Shahed Shafiq, “Taxicab fare disparity remains,” Dhaka Tribune, January  16, 2018, https://bit.ly/3bQtnxZ; Barcelona N’ Do, “Taxi Barcelona: Barcelona Taxi Rates 2019,” https://bit.ly/2JEtjFE;  Getting Around Germany, “Taxis,” https://bit.ly/34aOWqm; Jimmy Dunn, “Getting Around in Cairo,” Tour Egypt,  https://bit.ly/2R9dpqS; Taxi Calculator, https://bit.ly/2UL3WbH; Associated Press, “Mumbai’s venerable ‘Fiat taxis’ begin  to disappear,” The Denver Post, August 2, 2013, https://dpo.st/2Rr9DcP; Co-Pierre Georg and Michael E. Rose, “Licensing  metered taxis does more harm than good—South Africa should stop it,” University of Cape Town, September 4, 2016,  https://bit.ly/2yAf2HN; Kayla Wong, “Taxi fare increased in Seoul, South Korea from Feb. 16, 2019,” Mothership, February  20, 2019, https://bit.ly/2RahBqw; “Medellin Taxi Guide: Fares and Tips for Using Taxis—2019 Update,” Medellin Guru,  November 23, 2019, https://bit.ly/3c2smmT; Yonhap, “Seoul to increase taxi supply to meet seasonal demand,” The Korea  Herald, December 23, 2019, https://bit.ly/349oHAM; all accessed March 2020.  

217 Dirk VanderHart, “Proposal To Regulate Uber, Lyft Spurs Debate In Oregon Capitol,” Oregon Public Broadcasting, March 18,  2019, https://bit.ly/2xKsW9Z; Steven Schelling, “Uber town-car service shut down in Vancouver by B.C. Passenger  Transportation Board,” The Georgia Straight, Vancouver Free Press, November 28, 2012, https://bit.ly/2xJxnSh; Bridget Judd,  “Uber approved in the Northern Territory, but it might not be coming to a town near you,” ABC News, Australian  Broadcasting Corporation, July 3, 2018, https://ab.co/2V2wVqb; Jon Henley, “Uber to shut down Denmark operation over  new taxi laws,” The Guardian, March 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/39GUevc; Ekaterina Markova, “Bulgaria: Supreme Court shuts  down smartphone car service Uber,” Eurofound, January 25, 2016, https://bit.ly/2Rer93Q; Natasha Lomas, “Uber’s ride-hailing  business hit with ban in Germany,” TechCrunch, December 19, 2019, https://tcrn.ch/2X57dUN; Russell, “Uber has already  made billions from its exits in China, Russia and Southeast Asia”; Shasta Darlington and Ernesto Londoño, “Brazil Becomes  Uber’s Latest Regulatory Battleground,” New York Times, November 5, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2x24CAh; Romain Dillet, “Uber  Suspends UberPOP In France Following Turmoils And Arrests,” TechCrunch, July 3, 2015, https://tcrn.ch/2X5OtV7 and Ivana  Kottasova, “Uber fined by France for running illegal taxi service,” CNN, June 9, 2016, https://cnn.it/2V4dTzA; Venus Wu and  Sijia Jiang, “Hong Kong police arrest 21 Uber drivers,” Reuters, May 23, 2017, https://reut.rs/2yC8Vmt and Sum Lok-kei,  “Three ride-hailing apps put to the test in Hong Kong – Uber, Fly Taxi and new cab industry-backed eTaxi. Which came out on  top?” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2019, https://bit.ly/3dWivAI; Giulia Segreti, “Italy court blocks Uber services in  Italy, citing unfair competition,” Reuters, April 7, 2017, https://reut.rs/2x1YuIf; all accessed February 2020. 

218 Cited in Farronato, MacCormack, and Mehta, “Innovation at Uber: The Launch of Express POOL,” as compiled by  casewriter: Uber, “Company Info,” 2018, https://ubr.to/2xIGJJK; Jillian D’Onfro and Josh Lipton, “Uber Posts Big Sales Jump  in First Quarter and Boosts Valuation to $62 Billion,” CNBC, May 23, 2018, https://cnb.cx/2LsID7N; Dickey and Lunden,  “Uber’s Raising up to $600M in a Secondary Round at $62B Valuation, Q1 Sales Grew to $2.5B”; “Lyft Raises New Capital and  Continues Momentum,” Lyft (blog), June 27, 2018, https://lft.to/2IKNzCG; “Our 2017 in Review,” Lyft (blog), January 16,  2018, https://lft.to/2Nk0mzq; Dara Kerr, “Lyft Grows Gangbusters in 2017, Bringing Competition to Uber,”Cnet, January 16,  2018, https://cnet.co/2lQkgpf; Xiaochun Zhao, “Losing $300M in 2017, Didi Chuxing Wants to Turn a Profit in 2018 amid  Fierce Competition,” Kr Asia, April 3, 2018, https://bit.ly/2z64UWY; Johana Bhuiyan, “China Ride-Hail Giant Didi Chuxing  Has Raised $4 Billion,” Recode, December 20, 2017, https://bit.ly/2BJddpA; Xinhua, “Didi Completes 7.43 Bln Rides in 2017,”  January 8, 2018, https://bit.ly/2z61UtS; “Ola,” Crunchbase, https://bit.ly/2MGmuCP; Arjun Kharpal, “Uber’s Biggest Rival in  India Just Got $1.1. Billion from Tencent, SoftBank, Valuing Company around $7 Billion,” CNBC, October 11, 2017,  https://cnb.cx/2hAS9rJ; Anaya Bhattacharya, “As Uber Sputters, Ola Is Really Stepping on the Gas in India,” Quartz,  February 15, 2018, https://bit.ly/2EvFQHq; Sayan Chakraborty, “Ola, Uber See Rides Rise Fourfold in 2016: Report,”  LiveMint, February 17, 2017, https://bit.ly/2Krn4YJ; Shashwati Shankar, “Undeterred by High Attrition Rate, Ola and Uber  Banking on Drivers in Their 20s,” The Economic Times, June 1, 2017, https://bit.ly/2tOGHzn; “Billion Dollar Unicorns: Grab  Becomes the Most Valuable Startup in Southeast Asia,” One Million by One Million Blog, December 8, 2017,  

https://bit.ly/2z5RDxI; “You’re One in a Billion,” Grab (blog), November 6, 2017, https://bit.ly/2j5Mu0Z; Jon Russell, “Go Jek Buys Three Startups to Advance Its Mobile Payment Business,” TechCrunch, December 15, 2017, https://tcrn.ch/2BLuAIt;  “GO-JEK,” Crunchbase, https://bit.ly/2rk0yag; Anshuman Daga, “Indonesia’s Go-Jek Raises $1.5 Billion as Ride-Hailing  Market Heats Up: Sources,” Reuters, February 26, 2018, https://reut.rs/2F5QGUC; Taxify,”Crunchbase,  

“https://bit.ly/2NkqiL9; Jon Russell, “Uber’s European Rival Taxify Raises $175M Led by Daimler at a $1B Valuation,”  TechCrunch, May 30, 2018, https://tcrn.ch/2J09giY; Frank DiPietro, “Yandex.Taxi Is Just One Example of the Sprawling  Empire Yandex Is Building in Russia,” The Motley Fool, July 26, 2017, https://bit.ly/2KFaf9a; all accessed June 2020. 29 

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